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POLICIES OF INEQUITY — A WORLD APART: A
COMPARISON OF THE POLICIES TOWARD INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES OF A POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPING NATION
TO THOSE OF A POST-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPED NATION
Caitlain Devereaux Lewis*
I. Introduction
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found
by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an
ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy,
our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands . . . , until they
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is
deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence.1
Federal Indian law is rooted in a history of conquest and colonization.
Indeed, theories of conquest2 and discovery3 rights are the foundation of
* Law Clerk, United States Court of International Trade. B.S., Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute; M.S., University at Albany; J.D., Albany Law School. Editor-inChief, Albany Law Review, 2010–2011. The views expressed in this article are solely those
of the author.
The author wishes to thank Professor Robert C. Batson, Government Lawyer in
Residence at the Government Law Center of Albany Law School, whose Federal Indian Law
course inspired this article, and her parents, George T. Lewis and Linda Embser Lewis, who
showed her the entire world in extraordinary detail.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959) (“Through conquest and
treaties [the Indian tribes] were induced to give up complete independence and the right to
go to war in exchange for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.”); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (“After conquest [the tribes] were permitted to
occupy portions of territory over which they had previously exercised ‘sovereignty’ . . . .
This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy . . . . This position of the
Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory that discovery and conquest gave the
conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the lands thus obtained.”).
3. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515, 543–44 (1832) (“To avoid
bloody conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it was necessary for the nations
of Europe to establish some principle which all would acknowledge, and which should
decide their respective rights as between themselves. This principle, suggested by the actual
state of things, was, ‘that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by
whose authority it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.’” (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543, 573
(1823))); Worcester, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 543–44 (“This principle, acknowledged by all
Europeans . . . gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the
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many of the early Federal Indian law decisions that still serve as precedent
for cases decided today.4 This body of law evolved out of what is known as
the “classic phase”5 of colonization when “colonial contact metamorphosed
over time into the successful full-scale implantation of Western society on
extra-European soil.”6 Many comparative studies of the legal regimes
governing indigenous peoples that evolved out of this classic phase of
colonization have been conducted, especially those comparing the policies
of common law countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.7
Yet, the classic phase is not the only model of colonization. Indeed,
“[s]tate conquest and incorporation have happened in diverse places to
millions of indigenous people over the past few centuries. The process has
many histories. But as different as these histories are, they seem to share
certain features.”8 For example, “[i]t [is] evident in looking beyond the
reservation system in the United States that . . . power relationships are not
unique to Native American communities. Similar patterns shape the
experience of other indigenous peoples in different state systems.”9
An interesting comparison can be made between the governing systems
affecting Native Americans and those of post-colonial, developing nations.
sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it.”); Johnson, 21 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 584 (“Thus, all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this
continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognized in others, the exclusive right of
the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”).
4. See, e.g., Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 234
(1985) (“The ‘doctrine of discovery’ provided . . . that discovering nations held fee title to
these lands, subject to the Indians’ right of occupancy and use. As a consequence, no one
could purchase Indian land or otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the
sovereign.” (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 667
(1974))).
5. MAIVÂN CLECH LÂM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELFDETERMINATION 14 (2000) (“The classic phase of this at first European enterprise . . . may
be said to run from Columbus’ arrival in the New World in 1492 to the General Assembly
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960.
Victims in the classic phase included peoples who had already constituted themselves into
centralized nations at the time of contact with the West as well as others who, while
organized on a subsistence basis, occupied territories that were accessible to Western
intruders.”).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PERRY, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
STATE SYSTEMS xiii (1996) (listing examples of such comparative studies and stating that
“[a] number of studies already have drawn some limited comparisons, especially between
Canada or the United States and Australia”).
8. Id. at xi.
9. Id. at xiii.
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Such developing nations are governed by the predominant indigenous
groups that inherited power from former colonizing powers, usually
European, when they relinquished control over their colonies. While these
governments are composed of the predominant indigenous groups, there is
often a subset of disfavored or minority indigenous people who are then
governed by the indigenous peoples favored by the colonizing power.
Thus, a comparison between the policies of post-industrial, developed
nations toward their indigenous peoples, such as those embodied in Federal
Indian law, and the policies of post-colonial, developing nations, serves as
an interesting study in power relationships, ethnic tension, and legal
justifications. Surprisingly,
[m]any so-called Third World states, which themselves had
experienced colonization, seem to repeat the action of earlier
European states in their own policies toward indigenous
peoples . . . . “Territorial consolidation, national integration, the
imperatives of population growth, and economic development
are phrases used by Third World states to cover up the killing of
indigenous nations and peoples.”10
This article examines the policies of one post-colonial, developing
nation, the Republic of Indonesia, toward its minority indigenous
populations. As in Federal Indian law, which “is a subject that cannot be
understood if the historical dimension of existing law is ignored,”11 these
policies are best understood within their historical context. To this end, this
article is arranged chronologically and begins by briefly outlining contact
with the indigenous peoples of West Papua during the colonial era. It will
then provide an examination of the Indonesian government’s policies
toward West Papua during the infancy of the Republic: the “Irian Jaya” era.
Finally, this article will examine the most recent policies of the twenty-first
century that evolved in reaction to separatist sentiment. In the process, the
article will draw comparisons to the policies of Federal Indian law in order

10. Id. at 203 (quoting Bernard Nietschmann, Third World Colonial Expansion:
Indonesia, Disguised Invasion of Indigenous Nations, in TRIBAL PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 191, 192 (John H. Bodley ed., 1988)).
11. Nathan R. Margold, Introduction, in Felix COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW xxvii (Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942); see also South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511–12 (1986) (Blackmon, J., dissenting) (“Even more than
other domains of law, ‘the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law deman[d] an
appreciation of history.’” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, A Jurisprudential
Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 356 (1954))).
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to make observations about how the policies of post-colonial, developing
nations toward their indigenous peoples correspond to and differ from those
of post-industrial developed nations, such as the United States.
A. The Republic of Indonesia and the Island of Papua: An Overview of the
Population and Geography
With a population of over two hundred million, Indonesia is the world’s
fourth most populous nation.12 Composed of over 17,000 islands, it is also
the world’s largest archipelago,13 and “[s]pread out over these many islands
are literally hundreds of spoken dialects and cultural sub-groups.”14 Of the
islands, West Papua, Kalimantan, and Sumatra are the largest, and are
among the five largest islands in the world.15 West Papua is the western
half of the island of New Guinea. The island of New Guinea is “the most
culturally diverse place on earth. This one island harbors nearly a thousand
distinct languages and cultures — one-fifth of the world’s total.”16 While
West Papua is part of Indonesia, the eastern part of the island was formerly
held by Australia and is now the independent nation of Papua New
Guinea.17
West Papua18 was previously known as Netherlands New Guinea (up
until 1962), West Irian (from 1962 to 1973), and Irian Jaya (from 1973 to
2001), but was renamed West Papua in 2001.19 West Papua is considered a
province of Indonesia and is “‘roughly the size of France, has a population
under two million in a country of over two hundred million, and its capital,
Jayapura, is some 3500 kilometers (2100 miles) from the Indonesian capital
[of] Jakarta.’”20 It is also “the most resource-rich region of the Indonesian
archipelago, yet most of its native population lives in abject poverty.”21
12. INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK: REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 2 (Sawyer Miller
Consulting 1997) [hereinafter INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK].
13. Id.
14. ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA IN THE 1990S, at 6 (1994).
15. Id.
16. ART DAVIDSON, ENDANGERED PEOPLES 172 (1993).
17. DATUS C. SMITH, JR., THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF INDONESIA 8 (rev. ed. 1983).
18. This article will refer to the Indonesian part of the island of New Guinea as “West
Papua” and its peoples as “West Papuans,” unless use of one of the former names within its
historical context is appropriate. “Papua New Guinea” will refer to the independent nation
on the eastern part of the island.
19. Diana Glazebrook, “If I Stay Here There Is Nothing yet If I Return I Do Not Know
Whether I Will Be Safe”: West Papuan Refugee Responses to Papua New Guinea Asylum
Policy 1998–2003, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 205, 206 (2004).
20. Amber Dufseth, Comment, Indonesia’s 1999 Political Laws: The Right of
Association in Aceh and Papua, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 613, 624 (2002) (quoting HUMAN
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B. Tribes of Papua
West Papua is home to approximately 312 tribes, some of which have
yet to be contacted.22 Among the better known of these tribes are the
Amungme, Asmat, Dani, and Moi.23 Interestingly, the Dani were not
“discovered” by westerners until 1938.24 The indigenous population of
West Papua is comprised of approximately one million people, and consists
of “hundreds of distinct societies and languages.”25 Most of these people
live “in villages and hamlets linked by ties of trade, ceremonial exchange,
The “central
marriage, and intermittent small-scale conflicts.”26
mountainous region of Papua is home to the highland peoples, who practice
pig husbandry and sweet potato cultivation,” and the “lowland peoples live
in swampy and malarial coastal regions, and live by hunting the abundant
game, and gathering.”27 While some of the hundreds of Papuan tribal
languages are related to one another, others are entirely unique.28 The
indigenous Papuan groups are all “ethnically distinct from the Indonesians
who control their country,”29 and they have “no history of any large-scale
overall political organization that united more than a few groups.”30
C. History of the Area
Like those of Federal Indian law, the policies of Indonesia toward its
indigenous peoples can only be understood with “an appreciation of
history,”31 therefore a brief historical overview is necessary.
The Dutch arrived in the Indonesian islands early in the seventeenth
century and by 1602 had established the Dutch East India Company.32
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA, 1999–2000, at
2 (2000)).
21. Correspondent’s Diary, Cursed by Plenty: Paying a Covert Visit to Papua’s
Fighters in the Forest, ECONOMIST (July 8, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/1652
4650.
22. Papuan Tribes, SURVIVAL INT’L, http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/Papuan
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
23. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 171–78.
24. See Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
25. PERRY, supra note 7, at 205.
26. Id.
27. Papuan Tribes, supra note 22.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. PERRY, supra note 7, at 205.
31. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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Contact with the island of New Guinea, however, was minimal. Indeed, it
was not until 1848 that “the powers of Holland and Britain artificially
divided the island at the 141st meridian.”33 This dividing line between the
sovereign nation of Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian province of
West Papua remains today.
Foreign activity on the island climaxed during the Second World War.
Indeed, in 1944 General Douglas MacArthur made his headquarters in West
Papua and “[f]rom a mountaintop near what was then the Dutch colonial
town of Hollandia he planned America’s recapture of the Philippines from
Japanese occupation.”34 While Indonesia remained under Dutch rule at the
onset of World War II, Japan occupied the country from 1942 to 1945.35
When the Japanese withdrew at the end of the war, Indonesia, under the
guidance of President Sukarno,36 the first president of Indonesia, declared
its independence in order to prevent Holland from reentering.
The 1949 transfer of sovereignty formalized Indonesia’s independence,
but “left the determination of the fate of West Papua to later negotiations.”37
In the interim, Holland continued to hold the area, “but Indonesia pressed
its claim in the United Nations . . . and elsewhere”38and the Dutch
administration in West Papua endeavored “‘to create conditions for the selfdetermination of a population.’”39 To this end,
[u]nder Dutch tutelage the West Papuan New Guinea Council
(partly elected parliament) was installed in 1961 by almost
universal suffrage. Political parties and trade unions were
formed, public service positions were increasingly filled by
32. M.C. RICKLEFS, A HISTORY OF MODERN INDONESIA SINCE C.1300, at 27 (2d ed.
1993). In the Dutch language, the Dutch East India Company is known as Vereenigde OostIndische Compagnie or VOC, which translates to the “United East India Company.” Id. at
xviii.
33. DENISE LEITH, THE POLITICS OF POWER: FREEPORT IN SUHARTO’S INDONESIA 10
(2003).
34. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
35. SUDARGO GAUTAMA & ROBERT N. HORNICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDONESIAN
LAW: UNITY IN DIVERSITY 181 (rev. ed. 1974).
36. There are two conventions for spelling Indonesian names, the Dutch and the
English. Using the Dutch spelling, Sukarno is spelled “Soekarno,” while Suharto is spelled
“Soeharto.” For purposes of this article, the English spellings of Indonesian names (i.e.,
Jakarta, Sukarno, and Suharto) will be used, except in quoted material.
37. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119.
38. SMITH, supra note 17, at 8.
39. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119 (citing A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 7 (1973)).
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Papuans, and a plan was launched to place West New Guinea
under United Nations control pending independence. Finally, a
Papuan crest, national anthem, and flag (the Morning Star) were
introduced and the western half officially renamed West Papua.40
In some ways, this period is reminiscent of a brief period in Federal Indian
law, the Indian New Deal era from the late 1920s to the 1940s, when tribes
were provided with tools to become self-sufficient, both economically and
culturally.41 Like the brief Indian New Deal period, the West Papuan
experience with independence was fleeting.
West Papua enjoyed independence during a ten-month period from 1961
to 1962,42 but President Sukarno “responded by declaring a campaign of
total mobilization to wrest Netherland’s New Guinea from the Dutch.”43
Indonesia viewed “the continuing Dutch presence as the prolongation of
colonialism” and “nothing other than a desperate Dutch ploy to leave in
place a regime favorable to the Netherlands and hostile to Djakarta.”44
Coincidentally, it was Indonesia’s second president, Suharto, who was
charged with planning and carrying out Sukarno’s military campaign;45
however, the “forces available to [Suharto] were appallingly ill prepared,
his initial losses were high, and he was saved from having to launch the
invasion Sukarno wanted by the intervention of the United States.”46
The impasse between Indonesia and the Netherlands ended in 1962
when the Netherlands entered into the “New York Agreement” which was
mediated by the United States.47 Under this Agreement, the “Dutch would
leave West Papua and transfer sovereignty to the United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority . . . for a period of [six] years.”48 Under
40. LEITH, supra note 33, at 11.
41. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1339 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
Lexis Nexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
42. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
43. Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 206.
44. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119.
45. See JOHN BRESNAN, MANAGING INDONESIA: THE MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 47
(1993).
46. Id.
47. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120.
48. 145 CONG. REC. H9197 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1999) (statement of Del. Eni
Faleomavaega) [hereinafter Statement of Del. Faleomavaega]; see also Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,
New Era for Free Papua Movement, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 3, 1998, at 4 (“After five months
of talks . . . Indonesian and Dutch negotiators signed ‘the Agreement between the Republic
of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West
Irian)’ at the UN headquarters in New York on Aug. 15, 1962. Under the New York
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the supervision of the United Nations, Indonesia agreed to then “allow
[West Papua’s] inhabitants to engage in an act of self-determination
regarding its political status by no later than 1969.”49 This plebiscite later
became known as the “Act of Free Choice.”50 Interestingly, although “their
fate was to be decided at the United Nations, the West Papuans were never
heard from by that body. The discussions of West Papua’s selfdetermination engaged states only, including highly interested ones, but not
the people centrally affected.”51
The “Act of Free Choice” was to “be held in 1968 to determine whether
the inhabitants desired to be a part of Indonesia.”52 However, “Indonesia
orchestrated an election that many regarded as a brutal military operation.
In what came to be known as an ‘act of no-choice,’ . . . 1025 elders under
heavy military surveillance were selected to vote on behalf of 809,327 West
Papuans on the territory’s political status.”53 The United Nations (“UN”)
“simply noted that irregularities had occurred and went on to validate
Indonesia’s extension of sovereignty over West Papua.”54 The UN sent
Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz to observe the plebiscite55 to ensure it was
conducted in accordance with international practices.56 Ambassador OrtizSanz issued the following statement:
I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the
implementation of article XXII of the Agreement relating to the
rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement
and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area. In spite of my
constant efforts, this important provision was not fully

agreement, the Netherlands transferred the administration of the territory to a United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on Oct. 1, 1962, and then after May 1, 1963, the
UNTEA and Indonesia jointly administered the territory. A transitional period followed in
the history of Irian Jaya until 1969, when the Act of Free Choice was held.”).
49. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120.
50. See generally JOHN SALTFORD, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INDONESIAN
TAKEOVER OF WEST PAPUA, 1962–1969: THE ANATOMY OF BETRAYAL (2006).
51. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119–20.
52. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 624.
53. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
54. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120 (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES 84–86 (1995)).
55. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
56. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120 (citing CASSESE, supra note 54, at 84).
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implemented and the Indonesian administration exercised at all
times a tight political control over the population.57
The United States also expressed concern about the process.58 Soon after
the “closely orchestrated vote, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi
Papua Merdeka or ‘OPM’) formed with a core of 200 fighters and began a
low-intensity insurgency.”59 In response to the OPM’s activities, in 1969
Indonesia declared Papua an “Operational Military Zone.” For this reason,
“the OPM has ‘never coalesced into the united or organized form its name
implies.’”60
After Indonesia took control of West Papua,
the next six years of military rule systematically dismantled the
symbols of West Papuan sovereignty: the West Papuan police
were confined to barracks; all political groups were disbanded;
the use of national symbols, including the words “Papuan” and
“Melanesian,” were outlawed; public gatherings of any kind
became illegal; freedom of movement and speech were denied,
and the Papuan education system was destroyed.61
While Sukarno’s leadership initiated a “struggle to establish an
ideological basis for the Indonesian state, and the military’s evolving role
within the leadership of that state,”62 Suharto perfected this struggle by the
time West Papua became part of Indonesia. As the first Indonesian
president to control West Papua, coupled with his thirty-two year tenure,
Suharto had the greatest impact upon the policies of Indonesia toward West

57. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
58. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21 (“Official documents released by America’s
National Security Archive in Washington, DC, reveal what the Americans were thinking at
the time. They knew perfectly well that there was no element of free choice in the Act of
Free Choice. In July 1969 the American embassy in Jakarta sent a confidential cable to
Washington saying that the Act of Free Choice was unfolding ‘like a Greek tragedy, the
conclusion preordained.’ Jakarta could and would not permit any resolution other than the
inclusion of Papua into Indonesia, the memo stated. America’s ambassador offered an
estimate: as many as 85–90% of all Papuans favoured independence. But, this being the
height of the Vietnam war, the Americans saw Indonesia as an indispensable ally in the
region.”).
59. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 624 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 6).
60. Id.
61. LEITH, supra note 33, at 12.
62. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 6.
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Papua.63 For this reason, a discussion of Suharto’s policies will constitute
the bulk of this article. After three decades under Suharto’s military
control, however, West Papua then experienced a number of short-term
presidents who brought in a new era of reform.64
II. Policies During the Colonial Era:
“Netherlands New Guinea” (1895–1962)
Just as the colonial period in the United States served as the basis of
Federal Indian law, so too did the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia set the
stage for the development of Indonesia’s policies toward the indigenous
peoples of West Papua. This is especially true in legal policies governing
ethnic divisions, natural resources management, economic development,
and transmigration policies.
A. Ethnic Division
In terms of ethnic divisions, “[f]rom the earliest days of Dutch
colonization, inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago have been divided
for legal purposes into various ‘population groups’ . . . based primarily on
racial origin.”65 These divisions determined the
kinds of contracts one might enter into and in what form,
whether one could own land and where, from whom one could
inherit wealth and in what ways. . . . This was so because distinct
rules of contract law, of property law, of inheritance law existed
for each group.66
Therefore, each population group “had what amounted to its own legal
system — separate regulations administered by separate government
officials and enforced in separate course of law.”67
Dutch colonial masters may have had a number of different motives for
dividing the population of the Indonesian islands along ethnic lines.
“Whatever the original motives, the division of colonial society into
population groups has survived the transfer of sovereignty, and citizens of
63. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH & ADVOCACY,
IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN INDONESIA 35
(1995) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMM.].
64. See infra Part V.
65. GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 35, at 1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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independent Indonesia, especially in matters of civil and commercial law,
are often subject to separate regulations depending on which population
group they belong to.”68 This is particularly true for the people of West
Papua, who were subjected to aggressive assimilationist policies under
Suharto.69
B. Exploitation of Natural Resources
The Dutch colonial period also emphasized the exploitation of natural
resources. In fact, the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian islands early in the
seventeenth century in search of riches, and by 1602 had established the
Dutch East India Company.70 Thus, the colonization of Indonesia began as
a commercial endeavor to exploit the spice wealth of the Indonesian
islands, and only later did it become a nationalized colony.71 Indeed, “[n]ot
until the 1930s did the Europeans venture into [Papua’s] mountainous
interior. They went looking for gold, and unexpectedly discovered a lost
world — millions of tribal people living a Stone Age life in the twentieth
century.”72
As is the case with many indigenous peoples around the world, the
Papuans are cursed with an abundance of natural resources, as they inhabit
“the most resource-rich region of the Indonesian archipelago.”73
Predictably, exploitation of these natural resources in the name of economic
development greatly influenced the policies implemented under President
Suharto.74 This is quite similar to the plight of many Native American
tribes; indeed,
[s]ome [thirty] tribes in the United States . . . own roughly onethird of the surface-accessible coal west of the Mississippi as
well as 15% of all coal reserves, 40% of all uranium ore, and 4%
of all oil found in the country. Not that these figures translate
into wealth for the concerned tribes.75
While exploitation of natural resources was part and parcel of the
European colonial enterprise, surprisingly “it is not clear that the leaders of
68. Id.
69. See infra Part IV.B.
70. RICKLEFS, supra note 32, at 27.
71. Id. at 26.
72. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 172.
73. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
74. See infra Part IV.E.
75. LÂM, supra note 5, at 19 (citing JULIAN BURGER, THE GAIA ATLAS OF FIRST PEOPLES
45 (1990)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

434

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

the independence movements in [Asia and Africa] saw anything
fundamentally wrong with the export-oriented economies that they
Alarmingly, “the social dislocation,
inherited from the West.”76
environmental degradation, cultural alienation, wealth differentiation, and
militarization that ‘going global’ produced in the Third World after
independence surpass in scale anything seen in colonial times.”77
This new model, called “neo-colonialism,” is characterized by
“externally controlled but internally mediated colonialism,” and has proven
“particularly threatening to indigenous and tribal peoples.”78 This results
from the dependency on a large supply of natural resources for intense
economic development, which has been the focus of many post-colonial,
developing countries. Inevitably, “[a]s raw materials for the industrial
economy ran out in accessible places, they had to be sought out in formerly
inaccessible ones, where the world’s remaining unassimilated peoples
live.”79
C. Transmigration
Transmigration is another major Dutch colonial policy that influenced
Indonesian policies toward West Papua, and was a core part of Suharto’s
social and developmental policies.80 Transmigration in many ways mirrors
the policies of the United States during the Removal Era,81 from the 1820s
to the 1840s. “Transmigration was first introduced by the Dutch in 1905
when they moved impoverished Javanese peasants to the less-populated
areas to supposedly allow them to start a new life. In reality they
represented a supply of cheap labor to foreign-owned plantations.”82
Suharto’s transmigration policies extended the Dutch policies into the postcolonial era, with transmigrants providing a supply of cheap labor to
support foreign investment in the nascent country.83

76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 17 (citing BURGER, supra note 75, at 35).
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id.
80. See infra Part IV.F.
81. The Removal Era began with the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830, under
which the federal government would provide lands west of the Mississippi in exchange for
the eastern lands of Native American tribes under purportedly voluntary conditions, although
great pressure was put on the tribes to enter into such removal treaties. Indian Removal Act,
ch. 148, § 2, 4 Stat. 411, 412 (1830).
82. LEITH, supra note 33, at 204.
83. See infra Part IV.F.
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III. Policies During the Infancy of the Indonesian Republic Under President
Sukarno: “West Irian” (1962–1967)
Generally speaking, “Indonesian law is a remarkably complex mixture of
Dutch legislation, uniquely indigenous institutions and Islamic
commandments.”84 In some ways, Federal Indian law parallels Indonesian
law with its various sources, such as the common law inherited from the
Anglo tradition, federal statutory law, and tribal law and constitutions.
While “Indonesia is the site of long-standing, diverse efforts to shape
lives in an Islamic way,” an important and unique aspect of Indonesian law
is the “local complexes of norms and traditions called adat, some 300-plus
of them according to conventional calculations.”85 While the impact of
adat is well documented, it is important to note that only certain aspects of
adat, that of the predominant ethnic groups such as the Javanese, figure into
Indonesian law in any major way.86 Throughout its legal history,
Indonesians have been trying to work out ways to reconcile th[e]
normative florescence [of adat], and to do so within resolutely
centralizing forms of state rule, under the Dutch, under the
democracy, real and then “guided,” of the first president,
Sukarno, . . . and now, under what looks increasingly like
“unguided chaos” under a succession of short-term presidents.87
Given this diversity of legal influences, coupled with “literally hundreds of
spoken dialects and cultural sub-groups,”88 it is “[l]ittle wonder, then, that
maintaining national unity has been the one constant preoccupation of all of
Indonesia’s leaders.”89 As will be demonstrated, the overemphasis on
centralization, assimilation, and integration of the Indonesian Republic has
had devastating effects on minority indigenous groups such as the West
Papuans.

84. GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 35, at v.
85. JOHN R. BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
PUBLIC REASONING 3–4 (2003).
86. See generally id. at 13–14.
87. Id. at 4.
88. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 6.
89. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

436

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

A. Adoption of the Constitution and Establishment of Early Laws
The Indonesian Constitution was initially adopted in 1945 and was
“drafted hastily to declare independence, in the wake of the retreating
Japanese occupation forces and in anticipation of the returning Dutch.”90
While the Constitution has been amended a number of times, this founding
document “embodied the concept of a single nation and gave little
recognition to ethnic diversity. This Constitution was inspired by organicist
theories that espoused strongly centralized, integrative mechanisms tying
together state and society.”91 It left little room for regional variation, and
therefore precluded any notion of sovereignty, in great contrast to the
important role sovereignty has played in Federal Indian law.
The 1945 Constitution also established the structure of the government.
There are six principal bodies of the Indonesian Republic: the People’s
Consultative Assembly, the House of People’s Representatives, the
Presidency, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Advisory Council, and the
State Audit Board.92 The Constitution did not delineate with precision the
roles of these six governing bodies, but it became clear under President
Sukarno that the main governing authority was the Presidency, with the
other bodies taking a submissive role. Indeed, the 1945 Constitution
“allowed the regime to consolidate the power of the president and the
armed forces.”93 Additionally, with “a few notable exceptions, . . . the
Constitution rejected individual protections as well as checks on the
executive. It created the basis for a strong presidency and conceived the
institutional framework of the state as an organic whole with strong powers
to control all sectors of society.”94

90. Jacques Bertrand, Indonesia’s Quasi-Federalist Approach: Accommodation Amid
Strong Integrationist Tendencies, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 576, 577 (2007).
91. Id.
92. INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 12, at 18–19.
93. Bertrand, supra note 90, at 587 (citing ROBERT EDWARD ELSON, SUHARTO: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 86–90, 159–65 (2001); DAVID JENKINS, SUHARTO AND HIS GENERALS:
INDONESIA MILITARY POLITICS, 1975–1983, at 37–48 (1984)).
94. Id. at 584 (citing David Bourchier, Totalitarianism and the “National Personality”:
Recent Controversy About the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian State, in IMAGINING
INDONESIA: CULTURAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 157, 161–62 (Barbara MartinSchiller & James William Schiller, eds. 1997)).
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B. Republican Integrationism
While West Papua officially became part of Indonesia after President
Sukarno yielded power to President Suharto, Sukarno’s presidency built the
foundation for the policies Suharto imposed upon West Papua. Upon
independence on August 17, 1945, “Indonesia inherited jurisdiction over
many indigenous peoples” from the Dutch,95 and President Sukarno
immediately “sought control of the far-flung reaches of the former Dutch
East Indies.”96 The difficulties posed by the ethnic, cultural, and religious
diversity of the enormous archipelago were immediately recognized. “A
top aide warned [Sukarno] that trying to control such culturally diverse
peoples ‘is not going to work. They are totally different people, totally
different cultures. We should have nothing to do with them.’ But Sukarno
was determined to forge these hundreds of distinct cultures into a nation.”97
Therefore, from the early days of Sukarno’s presidency, he “emphasized the
building of a strong nation.”98 To this end, while Sukarno “ensconced his
government in [J]akarta on the island of Java, [he] ruled with an iron hand
and an eye to expansion. One of his first targets was New Guinea.”99
Republican integrationism also influenced Sukarno’s economic policies.
“All revenues, except for minor taxes, were collected by the central
government before budget allocations were redistributed to provinces and
regencies.”100 In practice, this meant that all revenues derived from the
outlying islands were collected in the capital, Jakarta, but very little were
redistributed to the source islands.101 In sharp contrast to Suharto’s
economic policies,102 under “President Sukarno, Indonesia traded with
Western industrialized countries but sought military and economic support
from the Communist bloc. The Sukarno period was marked by rhetoric
against the West and its aid.”103 Therefore, Western investment and
economic development in the islands, including Papua, was not a major
factor under President Sukarno, although it would later become the
centerpiece of Suharto’s rule.104
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

PERRY, supra note 7, at 203.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 171.
Id. at 171–72.
Bertrand, supra note 90, at 576.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 172.
Bertrand, supra note 90, at 588.
See id.
See infra Part IV.C.
LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 52.
See infra Part IV.C.
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C. Assimilation
In his pursuit of “building a single nation from the diverse peoples of the
former Dutch East Indies,” Sukarno’s republican integrationism “gave way,
over time, to assimilationist tendencies.”105 The policies of assimilation
were particularly prevalent in social and cultural areas. For example, “[t]he
educational system was standardized . . . and a top-down curriculum [was]
adopted, thereby creating an exclusive narrative of the country’s history
meant to inculcate a sense of [a] single Indonesian nation.”106 This
“narrative” did not include any reference to Papuan culture or
knowledge.107
These early assimilationist efforts of the Indonesian educational system
are quite comparable to those of the Indian boarding schools established
during the Allotment and Assimilation Periods of Federal Indian law to
“inculcate [Indian children] with American culture, language, and
religion.”108 In Indonesia, “[c]ultural differences were acknowledged only
with respect to artifacts that could be displayed in museums, in colorful
dress for weddings, or as a way to promote tourism; such differences were
not permitted to seep into the realm of politics, government, and
administration.”109 More profoundly, “[l]ocal languages could be used only
in the first few years of primary school in selected regions; Indonesian was
the only language for all subsequent levels of education.”110 As history
unfolded, Papua was not identified as one of the “selected regions” where
local languages were retained. West Papua, having experienced ten months
of independence from the Dutch before being annexed by Indonesia,111
became the forefront of resistance to assimilation. Eventually, the
Indonesian government responded by
adopt[ing] assimilationist policies to strengthen integrationist
institutions in Papua. More so than in other regions, it imposed
stringent restrictions on cultural expression through the
educational system or other public forums. Indonesian was
decreed the sole language of education, and a national
curriculum, with almost no local content, was imposed on
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Bertrand, supra note 90, at 577.
Id. at 588.
See id.
ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 126 (2nd ed. 2010).
Bertrand, supra note 90, at 588.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.
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Papuans; even local songs were banned in some instances.
Political expression, such as the raising of the Morning Star flag,
was strongly repressed, as was the revival of calls for the
integration of West Irian or for alternative political
representation.112
IV. Policies During the “New Order” Under President Suharto:
“Irian Jaya” (1967–1998)
A. Development of the Constitution
After President Suharto assumed power in 1967, two important changes
were made to the Constitution, both of which intensified the harm against
West Papuans that was initiated by Sukarno’s republican integrationism.
The first of these major changes was the adoption of a national “ideology”
called Pancasila, which is embodied in the amended Constitution.113
Pancasila “is comprised of five fundamental principles: the belief in one
supreme God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia,
democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives and
Adherence to these principles of monotheism,
justice for all.”114
humanitarianism, national unity, representative democracy by consensus,
and social justice profoundly affected the shape of legislation and other
social policies toward West Papua under Suharto.115 Suharto also adopted a
“social policy” of multiculturalism, which is termed Bhineka Tunggal Ika,
or “Unity in Diversity.”116 While this policy sounds like an attempt to
embrace the diversity of the archipelago, it was actually adopted to further
promote and solidify the integrationist regime established by Sukarno.
B. Further Centralization of Government and Political Integration
Resistance to Suharto’s Bhineka Tunggal Ika policy was “repressed
harshly.”117 Furthermore, “the autocratic and integrationist spirit of the
Constitution and its unitary principles [i.e., Pancasila] guided the regime’s
responses to regional challenges. The Regional Law of 1974 established
the framework for regional representation, clearly placing the provinces and
regencies, or municipalities, under the authority of the central
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Bertrand, supra note 90, at 590.
INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 12, at 18.
LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 38.
Id.
INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 12, at 2.
Bertrand, supra note 90, at 576.
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government.”118 Indeed, instead of empowering regional leaders with a
voice in the central government, the Regional Law of 1974 simply sent
agents from the central government to the remote reaches of West Papua to
ensure adherence to the integrationist policies.119 Like Sukarno, Suharto’s
government followed “an aggressive policy of political integration and
often . . . used force to compel acquiescence among its indigenous
peoples.”120
The integrationist and assimilationist policies serve as a good
comparison to the assimilationist tendencies underlying many periods of
Federal Indian law, especially the Reservation, Allotment, and Assimilation
eras. Indeed, part of North America’s “Indian problem” was the issue of
“cultural transformation: how best to accomplish the cultural transformation
of Indians into non-Indians.”121
During the Allotment and Assimilation eras, “Congress authorized
forcible assimilation measures and [the] Supreme Court created the plenary
power doctrine to sanction these measures.”122 This was because “Congress
increasingly adhered to the view that the Indian tribes should abandon their
nomadic lives on the communal reservations and settle into an agrarian
economy of privately [] owned parcels of land.”123 This shift focused on
the “Indians’ assimilation into American society.”124
As will be
demonstrated, many of Suharto’s specific policies toward West Papua had a
similar assimilationist goal.
C. Economic Development
Upon assuming power, Suharto “viewed economic development and
strong centrali[z]ed political control as flip sides of the same coin.”125 Like
many post-colonial, developing nations, particularly in Southeast Asia,
Suharto’s government sought “much of its legitimacy through its success in
economic development. As a result, any opposition to a government
development project [was] seen as a direct threat to stability and
development, and [was] met with harsh measures.”126 However, Suharto’s
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 587.
See id. at 587–88.
PERRY, supra note 7, at 203.
STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL
RESURGENCE 6–7 (1988).
122. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 79.
123. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984).
124. Id.
125. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 64.
126. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 51.
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emphasis on economic development was attractive to foreign investment.
Indeed, Suharto’s “[p]ro-business policies and . . . [twenty]-year legacy of
political stability . . . created a favorable environment.”127 While Suharto’s
policies created “an environment for business investment that [was] unique
among emerging market economies,”128 it was at the expense of indigenous
populations, many of which lived in areas rich with natural resources, ready
for exploitation by foreign investors.129
In furtherance of his economic policies, Suharto “adopted as a slogan a
‘trilogy of development’ consisting of stability, growth and equality. The
importance of the first element of that trilogy — stability — is apparent in
the establishment of the ‘security approach’ to governance. . . .”130 Under
this “security approach,” the Indonesian “military play[ed] a significant role
in the supervision of political management of the country, including
government operations and the execution of law.”131
D. Suharto’s “Security Approach”
Suharto’s reliance on the security approach is closely tied to his military
roots. “Soeharto came to power on the army’s coattails and the repressive
might of the army [was] . . . the single most important factor in
undermining potential opponents throughout his tenure.”132 Suharto relied
upon the military “to reinforce his power and maintain cohesion within the
archipelago,” and this “meant that the military was encouraged to
strengthen its existing politico-military role.”133 As such, the security
approach was the natural evolution and amplification of the integrationist
approach initially established by Sukarno.
Economic activities took place “within [a] . . . model of development
which emphasize[d] stability and a security approach to governance. The
Indonesian military [was] accorded dwi-fungsi[,] or dual function, in which
it [had] a social and political role in society as well as a military
one . . . .”134 Under Suharto’s economic development policies, the military
was “directed to ‘assist in the national development,’ and those who

127. INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 12, at 4 (“For example: . . .
American companies . . . invested more than $12 billion in Indonesia’s economy” by 1997.).
128. Id. at 6.
129. See infra Part IV.E.
130. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 35.
131. Id. at 35–36.
132. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 39.
133. LEITH, supra note 33, at 7.
134. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 3.
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oppose[d] national development [could] be found guilty of subversion.”135
For indigenous populations, especially those living in regions with
abundant natural resources, the military’s presence had devastating
consequences. Indeed, “the Asian Legal Resource Centre noted that the
most significant obstacle to the effective implementation of human rights in
[Indonesia was] fear of the military.”136
E. Natural Resources Management
Economic development, fueled by Indonesia’s abundant natural
resources, has produced the policies that have been most destructive to the
indigenous peoples of West Papua. Indeed, as discussed below,137 the
majority of legal actions involving the grievances of indigenous peoples in
Indonesia are against companies engaged in the extractive industries on
indigenous lands.
In many ways, the policies of the Indonesian government under Suharto
mirror another important aspect of North America’s “Indian problem”;
namely, there was “an economic problem: how best to secure access to
Indian resources.”138 However, in this regard, Native Americans have fared
better under Federal Indian law policies regarding natural resources than the
West Papuans did under the policies of Suharto. As some scholars have
noted, “because Soeharto opened Indonesia up to foreign investors and
allowed them to exploit the immense natural resources of the country,
without providing any legal protection or guarantees for the [indigenous
peoples],” they “have suffered a range of misfortunes since . . . [he] came
to power.”139
Because Suharto’s economic policies were part of a greater centralized
regime of integrationism, regional economic disparities resulted in wealth
moving from the resource-rich indigenous provinces to the capital city.140
Indeed, the “capital city has consistently been the only province without
minerals that has been among the richest in the nation. The exploitation of
mineral resources has made several provinces with relatively small

135. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 173.
136. Phutoli Shikhu Chingmak, International Law and Reparations for Indigenous
Peoples in Asia, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 409, 418 (Federico Lenzerini ed.,
2008) (footnote omitted).
137. See infra Part IV.E.6.
138. CORNELL, supra note 121, at 6.
139. Adérito de Jesus Soares, Reparations for Masyarakat Adat in Indonesia: A Somber
Tale, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 136, at 467, 467.
140. See BRESNAN, supra note 45, at 287.
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populations on the geographic periphery [including West Papua] the
nation’s wealthiest provinces in nominal terms.”141 In both Aceh and West
Papua, “the wealth produced per inhabitant (as measured by per capital
gross domestic product) is among the highest in Indonesia. But in both
provinces income and consumption per person — which more accurately
reflect the quality of living — fall much lower in the national rankings.”142
Under this system, those profits derived from natural resources that did not
accrue to the capital city went on to foreign companies, thereby resembling
the former colonial model wherein the Dutch exploited Indonesia’s
resources for the benefit of the Netherlands143 Therefore, “[f]rom the
perspective of resources-rich provinces like . . . Irian Jaya . . . , the
[Suharto] system seem[ed] like a replay of colonial times. Their natural
resources, according to their leaders, [were] exploited primarily to improve
living standards at the centre.”144
When combined with Suharto’s security approach, which guaranteed the
safety of foreign investments with security furnished by the military, West
Papua’s natural resources were not only “exploited at great profit for the
Indonesian government and foreign businesses, but at the expense of the
Papuan peoples and their homelands. When international companies come
to Papua, the Indonesian military accompanies them to ‘protect’ the ‘vital
projects.’”145 As a result, the Papuans “‘are not only fighting the military
within the country. [They] have come to realize that all the industrialized
countries of the North are also hurting [them].’”146
1. Timber Industry
In terms of timber, indigenous people in West Papua, particularly the
Moi Tribe, “have lost extensive lands to timber-cutting enterprises.”147 The
Moi Tribe is “totally dependent on the forest. But with the government’s
sanction, [a] logging company is cutting eight hundred and thirty-seven
thousand acres of trees in the heart of Moi ancestral lands.”148 As one Moi

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 63.
See supra Part II.B.
SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 63.
Papuan Tribes, supra note 22.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175.
PERRY, supra note 7, at 204.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 172.
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tribesman stated, “‘[t]earing down our forest is like tearing out our
hearts.’”149
As compared to the policies of Federal Indian law, Native Americans
have fared better in this area. For example, in a 1938 decision, United
States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, the court held that the Shoshone’s
possessory right to the land “included the timber and mineral resources
within the reservation.”150 The West Papuans, in contrast, have been unable
to establish any right to the land, possessory or otherwise, let alone to its
resources.
2. Extractive Industries
The most blatant abuses against the West Papuans, however, have
resulted from the extractive industries in West Papua. Indeed, it is difficult
to find any discussion of West Papua that does not reference the Freeport
McMoRan mining company’s operations in West Papua, and its decades of
confrontations with the indigenous people of West Papua.
The reign of Freeport in West Papua coincides with that of Suharto. “In
1967, a year after Suharto seized power in Jakarta, a new foreigninvestment law was passed. The first company to take advantage of the
new opportunities was Freeport” and it has maintained its facility ever
since.151 Freeport, headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, is the “largest
mining company in the world.”152 Over time, “[b]y maintaining a close
relationship with the Suharto regime and its feared arm of repression,
Freeport secured for itself a powerful political and economic insurance
policy.”153
By the 1990s, “Freeport financed Suharto’s government, his closest
associates, and even the president into the company on exceptionally
favorable, if not questionable, terms.”154 Freeport has also had a long-term
relationship with the Indonesian military: “[a]round 3000 Indonesian
soldiers and police are on guard to protect the mining facilities.”155 The
relationship between Suharto’s government and military and Freeport has

149. Id.
150. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938).
151. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21; see also LEITH, supra note 33, at 3 (“In 1967
Freeport became the first foreign company to sign a contract with the new regime in Jakarta
and became a significant economic and political actor within Indonesia.”).
152. Soares, supra note 139, at 471.
153. LEITH, supra note 33, at 3.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
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had a dramatic environmental impact on the lands of the indigenous people,
has impaired land ownership rights, and has resulted in serious human
rights violations.
3. Environmental Impact
Freeport mines “the world’s largest single reserve of both copper and
gold in the Grasberg minerals district in Papua.”156 In order to develop the
mine site after securing rights under Suharto’s Foreign Investment Law,
Freeport built a sixty-three mile road from the southern coast of West Papua
to its first mine, moving twelve million tons of earth in the process.157
Much of this development cut straight through the heart of indigenous
lands.158
In terms of the mining operation, the company mines
approximately 250,000 metric tons of ore per day, producing an additional
150,000 metric tons of overburden per day as a byproduct.159 In the
process, Freeport “is essentially grinding [an] Indonesian mountain into
dust, skimming off the precious metals, and dumping the remainder into the
Ajkwa River. The pulverized rock (called ‘tailings’) has created a
wasteland in the river valley below. [In 1996,] . . . the company [estimated
that it would] dump more than 40 million tons of tailings into the river
th[at] year alone.”160
Obviously, these activities have devastated indigenous lands. According
to a 1996 Dames & Moore environmental audit, which was endorsed by
Freeport, the “mine’s tailings have already ‘severely impacted’ more than
[eleven] square miles of rainforest, . . . [and] over the life of the mine 3.2
billion tons of waste rock — a great part of which generates acid — will be
dumped into the local river system.”161 Interestingly, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), a United States federal agency, had

156. FREEPORT-MCMORAN COPPER & GOLD, CONNECTING THE FUTURE: 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT 14 (2011), available at http://www.fcx.com/ir/AR/2011/FCX_AR_2011.pdf; see
also LEITH, supra note 33, at xv (Freeport “operat[es] the largest gold mine on Earth . . . in
the heart of West Papua.”); Robert Bryce, Spinning Gold, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 1996),
http://motherjones.com/politics/1996/09/spinning-gold?page=1 (“Since 1973, Freeport has
operated the world’s largest gold mine, located in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.”).
157. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
158. See infra Part IV.E.4.
159. FREEPORT-MCMORAN COPPER & GOLD, supra note 156, at 14; see also Bryce, supra
note 156 (estimating that the company was mining approximately 190,000 tons of ore per
day in 1996).
160. Bryce, supra note 156.
161. Id.
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insured Freeport’s mining operations in Indonesia.162 In recognition of the
vast environmental devastation resulting from Freeport’s operations,
however, in 1995 OPIC cancelled Freeport’s “$100 million political risk
insurance policy. . . . Officially, OPIC’s cancellation was for environmental
reasons, [and] according to U.S. federal law, the agency must take human
rights and environmental and health and safety issues into consideration
when issuing insurance.”163 However, because Freeport has operated with
the blessing of the Indonesian government, it has not suffered any other
repercussions — although it has been the target of increasing legal actions
initiated in United States courts.164
4. Land Ownership Rights
In addition to wreaking havoc on the indigenous environment, Freeport’s
operations have fundamentally impaired indigenous land ownership rights.
As for Native Americans, land plays a central role in West Papuan religion
and culture.
Others may laugh at our customs and how we are so closely
related to the land and all things that grow on the land. . . . But
all the trees, animals, fish, insects, reptiles, and even mountains
have special meaning for us. Long before whites came here,
these things were very sacred, because they were part of our
well-being.165
This sentiment is markedly similar to the Native American relationship to
land. Land “is the source of spiritual origins and sustaining myth[,] which
in turn provides a landscape of cultural and emotional meaning.”166
Freeport’s 1967 contract with the Indonesian government gave the
company access to 10,000 hectares of indigenous Amungme tribal land in
order to mine for copper.167 Just as environmental damage and human
rights violations have “continued to sour relations between the company
and the indigenous peoples[,] so too has the sensitive issue of land rights
recognition or recognisi, for arguably the greatest loss to these peoples has
162. Bryce, supra note 156; see OPIC: OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
http://www.opic.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
163. LEITH, supra note 33, at 176.
164. See infra Part IV.E.6.
165. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 173.
166. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 246, 250 (1989).
167. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48, at H9198.
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been spiritual.”168 This is because, similar to Native Americans, the “land
is their mother, it is where the souls of their ancestors live, it gives them
life.”169 In light of this, Freeport’s operations are particularly offensive:
In the process of taking twenty-five million tons of copper from
West Papua, Freeport excavated an enormous open-pit mine on
the traditional lands of the Amungme people. A mountain once
held sacred has been leveled, the people have lost their
livelihood, and effluents from the mine have polluted waters
downstream.170
Furthermore, when Freeport commenced its operations in West Papua, the
Amungme Tribe’s village “was moved to make way for the company town
[and] the Amungme graveyard was moved to build the company’s
helipad.”171
By 1996, Freeport exercised control over three times the amount of land
it started with, “and the company ha[d] no policy of commitment or royalty
distribution to the local community.”172 In 1977, the Amungme Tribe had
unsuccessfully attempted to gain compensation from the Indonesian
government for the land they lost to the mining operation to no avail.173
This was due to the Indonesian government’s view of indigenous land
ownership rights: “‘the land belongs to [the Papuans] only until the
government needs it. Then it belongs to the state. This means [the
Papuans] have no rights whatsoever. If the government wants your land,
you have to move. Just like that.’”174
This serves as a contrast to the possessory rights of Native Americans
under Federal Indian law. For example, in County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, the Oneidas were able to sue under federal common law to
validate their possessory rights.175 The Amungme Tribe has never had such
standing.
Similarly, Indonesia has refused to recognize the rights of the Moi Tribe,
whose land has been exploited extensively for timber. Like many Native
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

LEITH, supra note 33, at 108.
Id.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 176.
LEITH, supra note 33, at 209.
Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48, at H9198.
Id.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175.
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 236 (1985).
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American tribes, “Moi lands are ‘owned’ by clans and communities, not by
individuals, but Indonesia refuses to recognize their land rights.”176 From
the perspective of the Moi, they “‘are the people who [have] a right to this
land, an absolute right.’”177
However, the policies of Suharto’s government explicitly precluded any
West Papuan claim to their land. In some ways, the unilateral ability of
Suharto’s government to assume ownership of West Papuan indigenous
land parallels the origins of Federal Indian law. Under the Discovery
Doctrine in Federal Indian law, “discovery gave an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest.”178 Similarly, when foreign investors discovered an area ripe for
economic development in Indonesia, the Indonesian government simply
assumed ownership of the land.
5. Human Rights Violations
Suharto’s aggressive pro-development policies, coupled with the unique
power of the Indonesian military, combined to cause extensive human
rights violations that have occurred in furtherance of economic
development projects, such as Freeport’s mining operations. Indeed, the
“military presence is almost always associated with human rights violations
such as killings, arbitrary arrests, rape and torture. Those Papuans who
protest against the Indonesian government, the military or ‘vital projects’
are even more likely to experience abuses of their human rights.”179 These
human rights violations have been extensively documented. In fact, in
1999, a congressional hearing was held where Representative
Faleomavaega of American Samoa testified about the human rights abuses.
He reported,
since the Indonesian government seized control of West Papua,
the Papuans have suffered blatant human rights abuses, including
extrajudicial executions, imprisonment, torture and, according to
Afrim Djonbalic’s 1998 statement to the United Nations,
“environmental degradation, natural resource exploitation, and
commercial dominance of immigrant communities.” Sadly, . . .
a U.S.-based company mining copper, gold, and silver in West

176.
177.
178.
179.

DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 173.
Id.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
Papuan Tribes, supra note 22.
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Papua New Guinea allegedly shares in the exploitation and abuse
of Papuan lands and its people.180
Representative Faleomavaega also detailed Freeport’s relationship with the
Indonesian military, which has been responsible for many of the human
rights violations. He stated,
[s]pecific allegations have been made to Freeport’s direct
association with human rights abuses undertaken by the
Indonesian government on Freeport land. Freeport facilities are
policed both by Freeport security and the Indonesian military;
Freeport feeds, houses, and provides transportation for the
Indonesian military; and after any incidence of indigenous
resistance against Freeport, the military responds while Freeport
looks on.181
Two episodes brought Freeport’s activities to the attention of some
international organizations, including Amnesty International. In 1977,
Amungme villagers ejected two Indonesian policemen from their village,
and “the Indonesian military retaliated by strafing the area on the 22nd of
July, 1977, from two Bronko OV-IOs until they ran out of ammunition.’”182
The local people then retaliated “by blowing up a copper slurry pipe,” and
the military “responded with Operasi Tumpas (‘Operation Annihilation’).
‘The Indonesian military destroyed Amungme gardens, burned down
houses and churches, and tortured and killed men, women, and children.
The OPM believes thousands of Me, Dani, and Amungme were killed in
1977, although Indonesia claims it was far less, only about 900.’”183
Later that year, “when West Papuans attacked Freeport facilities, the
Indonesian military bombed the natives using U.S.-made Broncos.”184
After this episode, “Amnesty International reported that the military used
steel containers from Freeport to incarcerate indigenous people.”185 In sum,
Suharto’s security approach, coupled with his aggressive economic policies,

180. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
181. Id. at H9198.
182. PERRY, supra note 7, at 206 (quoting David Hyndman, Melanesian Resistance to
Ecocide and Ethnocide: Transnational Mining Projects and the Fourth World on the Island
of New Guinea, in TRIBAL PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW, supra
note 10, at 281, 286).
183. Id.
184. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
185. Id.
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have resulted in tremendous human rights violations in West Papua,
violations that occurred with the complicity of Freeport.
6. Legal Response
Remarkably, most of the judicial activity associated with the grievances
of indigenous peoples in Indonesia has occurred in United States courts.
This is due to the “inability of international environmental regulation to
protect developing countries from the activities of [transnational
corporations],” which “has led victims of environmental damage to seek
redress in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’).”186
Some of Freeport’s activities have also raised questions about possible
violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.187 To date, however,
Freeport has evaded any such liability, even though its dealings with the
Suharto administration have been called “questionable.”188
In West Papua, “[a]fter years of watching the degradation of the
environment and the human rights violations committed because of the
Freeport presence on his lands, Beanal, with the support of NGOs and a
private attorney from New Orleans, decided to take legal action.”189 Beanal
v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.190 was “the first legal action ever taken by any
[indigenous] group or individual in Indonesia.”191
In 1997, Beanal filed a complaint against Freeport in federal district
court in the Eastern District of Louisiana, invoking jurisdiction based upon
diversity of citizenship,192 the ATCA,193 and the Torture Victim Protection
186. Jean Wu, Note, Pursuing International Environmental Tort Claims Under the
ATCA: Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487, 489 (2001).
187. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
188. See LEITH, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing the use of “carried interest” as a device
for Freeport’s evasion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
189. Soares, supra note 139, at 471.
190. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
191. Soares, supra note 139, at 471.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006).
193. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). As this article went to press, the
United States Supreme Court issued a major decision involving claims made under the
ATCA. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 2013 WL 1628935 (U.S. Apr.
17, 2013). The issue in Kiobel was whether an ATCA claim could extend to conduct that
occurred in the territory of a foreign sovereign. Id. at *4. The Court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATCA, but stated that
“[o]n these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. at *13,
10.
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Act of 1991.194 Beanal was the leader of the Amungme Tribal Council.195
He alleged that
Freeport engaged in environmental abuses, human rights
violations, and cultural genocide. Specifically, he alleged that
Freeport mining operations had caused harm and injury to the
Amungme’s environment and habitat. He further alleged that
Freeport engaged in cultural genocide by destroying the
Amungme’s habitat and religious symbols, thus forcing the
Amungme to relocate. Finally, he asserted that Freeport’s
private security force acted in concert with the Republic to
violate international human rights.196
In addition to being the first lawsuit brought on behalf of indigenous people
in Indonesia, at the time it was also “the only environmental tort case
brought under the ATCA.”197
Enacted in 1789, the ATCA provides that federal “district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
Since plaintiffs have used the ATCA “successfully in
States.”198
international human rights cases, . . . victims of international environmental

It is important to note that Kiobel involved Nigerian nationals suing Dutch, British,
and Nigerian corporations, and there was consequently little nexus with the United States.
As the three concurrences point out, it is unclear whether the outcome would have been
different on another set of facts. See, e.g., id. at *11 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The opinion
for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach
and interpretation of the [ATCA]. In my view that is a proper disposition.”); id. at *12
(Breyer, J., concurring) (The majority opinion “makes clear that a statutory claim might
sometimes ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to
displace the presumption.’ It leaves for another day the determination of just when the
presumption against extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’” (citations omitted)). Indeed, in
his concurrence, joined by three other justices, Justice Breyer states, “I would find
jurisdiction under this statute where . . . the defendant is an American national, or . . . the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest, [including] a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe
harbor . . . for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.” Id. Hence, had the
defendant-corporation been an American corporation responsible for tortious conduct in a
foreign territory, the result may well have been different.
194. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
195. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 163.
196. Id.
197. Wu, supra note 186, at 490.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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abuse have attempted to use the ATCA to bring international environmental
rights cases.”199
Unfortunately, the district court ultimately dismissed Beanal’s case for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which was
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.200 The dismissal was
premised on both courts finding that “the allegations of human rights
violations lacked specificity. More importantly, the courts found that the
allegations of international environmental law violations were not
cognizable torts under the ATCA.”201
Despite the unfavorable outcome of Beanal, several other indigenous
groups in Indonesia have followed his lead and sought relief from
American corporations in United States courts. For example, in Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., Indonesian villagers in Aceh, Indonesia sued Exxon,
alleging “that Exxon’s security forces committed murder, torture, sexual
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other torts,” and sought relief
under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act.202 Similarly, in
Papua New Guinea, villagers brought an action against the Rio Tinto
mining group under the ATCA, claiming “that various war crimes, crimes
against humanity, racial discrimination, and environmental torts arose out
of Rio Tinto’s mining operations.”203
Indigenous Indonesian litigants have also pursued other strategies.
Yosefa Alomang, a West Papuan, brought a lawsuit against Freeport
alleging that “Freeport has engaged in human rights violations, cultural
genocide, and environmental violations through its corporate policies and
conduct at the Grasberg Mine, located in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.”204
Alomang’s claim for relief was based upon Louisiana state tort law.205
While unsuccessful, the increasing number of cases claiming relief under
United States law is an interesting correlation to the experience of Native
Americans, with both groups resorting to the same courtrooms for relief.
Litigation activity has also picked up on the domestic front in Indonesia,
with indigenous groups resorting to local courts. Predictably, these cases
also target foreign corporations. For example, in April 2005, a “criminal
199. Wu, supra note 186, at 489.
200. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
201. Wu, supra note 186, at 490–91.
202. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
203. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008).
204. Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., No. 96-2139, 1996 WL 601431, at *1 (E.D.
La. Oct. 17, 1996), aff’d, 811 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
205. Id.
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case was lodged by the Indonesian Prosecutor’s office” against PT
Newmont, an American mining company. This “law suit claimed that PT
Newmont did not have any permission to dump the tailings from its factory
into Buyat Bay.”206 In addition, Aurora Gold, an Australian mining
company, was sued in an Indonesian court.207
F. Transmigration
As discussed above, one of the Dutch colonial policies that left a lasting
legacy on the governance of Indonesia was transmigration.208 Indonesia
The
began its transmigration program under Suharto in 1969.209
transmigration program was a “massive resettlement effort designed to
move families from densely-populated Java and Bali to less crowed outer
islands of the Indonesian archipelago where they are . . . provided with
houses, land and other assistance to develop viable agricultural
communities.”210
The international community supported Suharto’s
transmigration project via the World Bank, which provided funding for
“seven projects totaling US $560 million approved between 1976 and
1985.”211
Like the removal policies of Federal Indian law, Suharto’s
transmigration program was voluntary, at least in nominal terms. However,
“‘[m]igrants are drawn to Papua because of money. Papua’s low
population, the richness of its natural resources and mild competition are
among the pull factors of migration to the region.’”212 For this reason,
“[w]ith more than 130 transmigration settlements in West Papua, it . . .
became the largest recipient of migrants so that the province, which is one
of the most sparsely populated in the archipelago, has the distinction of
having one of the highest population growth rates of any province.”213 The
success of Suharto’s transmigration program corresponds to a number of ill
effects in West Papua.
It has been widely acknowledged that “transmigration is a political rather
than an economic tool which seeks the integration and pacification of
206. Soares, supra note 139, at 472.
207. Id. at 473.
208. See supra Part II.C.
209. Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 208.
210. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 58.
211. Id.
212. Population Growth ‘Good for Papua,’ JAKARTA POST (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/23/population-growth-%E2%80%98good-papua%E2%80
%99.html.
213. LEITH, supra note 33, at 206.
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outlying regions.”214 Indeed, the transmigration program was part of the
broader integrationist policies of both Sukarno and Suharto. The
transmigration program under Suharto was an “integral part of the central
government’s policy of ‘Indonesianization’ or the creation of one kind of
Indonesian and focused on incorporating areas resistant to Jakarta’s rule,
such as East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua.”215 Assimilation as an official
component of the transmigration program is evident from a 1993 statement
of Indonesia’s former Minister of Transmigration: “‘different ethnic
groups . . . will in the long run disappear because of integration, and there
will be one kind of man.’”216
Transmigration also included a range of related “[c]oercive programs to
assimilate islanders and induce conformity with the predominant Javanese
population, [including the] suppression of local religious practices, forced
relocation to centralized villages, and such apparently trivial issues as
compulsory haircuts.”217 For these reasons, Indonesia’s transmigration
program relates to some of the foundational ideas of Federal Indian law.
President Jefferson once wrote, “our settlements will gradually
circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either
incorporate with us as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the
Mississippi.”218 This policy statement is synonymous with the policy
underlying Indonesia’s transmigration program.
As the “largest recipient of migrants,”219 the assimilative policies of
Suharto’s transmigration program have had devastating effects on West
Papuan culture.220 The Papuans “have been made a minority in their own
land.”221 From the West Papuan perspective, “transmigration settlements
are an integral component of Jakarta’s integration policy designed to
destroy the Melanesian culture.”222

214. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 58.
215. LEITH, supra note 33, at 205.
216. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175.
217. PERRY, supra note 7, at 204.
218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to William Henry
Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory (Feb. 27, 1803), available at http://www.let.rug.nl/
usa/presidents/thomas_jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jef151/php.
219. LEITH, supra note 33, at 206.
220. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175 (“In West Papua, transmigration supplies
cheap immigrant labor for the logging operators, but its hidden agenda is to extend
government control over indigenous peoples.”).
221. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
222. LEITH, supra note 33, at 218.
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In addition to its integrationist goals, the transmigration program has also
“focused on ensuring a supply of cheap and readily accessible labor to
foreign enterprises operating in the most remote regions of the
archipelago,”223 including the extractive industries operating in West
Papua.224 In exchange for migrating, transmigrants are guaranteed
employment in their new home. This has created an enormous economic
disparity in West Papua.
[P]oorly paid jobs . . . are filled by native Papuans while skilled
labour and commerce seem to belong exclusively to migrants
from elsewhere in Indonesia. . . . The sense of division is such
that nearly all the locals use the term ‘Indonesians’ to mean
migrants from elsewhere, as if they did not share a single
republic.225
This ethnic divisiveness harkens back to the divisions made along ethnic
lines by the Dutch, as discussed above.226
A final aspect of the transmigration program is that of relocating
indigenous people to make room for the transmigrants, called relokasi.
West Papuan “traditional landowners claim that from the very beginning,
because of [Freeport’s] presence on their land, their rights have been
violated through relokasi.”227 This is because Freeport employs many of
the transmigrants, but not the native population, and has therefore relocated
the Amungme Tribe to make room for its operations.228
The transmigration programs under Dutch colonial rule and under
Suharto are quite comparable to the policies of the Removal Era in the
United States. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act whereby
the federal government would provide lands west of the Mississippi in
exchange for tribes’ eastern lands, a purportedly voluntary exchange.229
Similarly, Indonesia’s transmigration policy is voluntary for the
transmigrants; however, the indigenous people are forcibly removed from
their lands to make way for the transmigrant settlements.230

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 205.
See supra Part IV.E.2.
Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21.
See supra Part II.A.
LEITH, supra note 33, at 217.
Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21; LEITH, supra note 33, at 209–12.
Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, § 2, 4 Stat. 411, 412 (1830).
Leith, supra note 33, at 4, 8–9.
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Because of the integrationist policies underlying Indonesia’s
transmigration program, there is also a correlation to the policies during the
Reservation Era in Federal Indian law, when the United States
“aggressively pursued assimilation and conversion to farming by Indian
people.”231 Finally, transmigration seems to closely parallel the policies
underlying the Allotment and Assimilation eras of Federal Indian law,
when “Congress authorized forcible assimilation measures and [the]
Supreme Court created the plenary power doctrine to sanction these
measures.”232
G. Civil Rights
Although the “right of political association was first established by
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, Article 28, which guarantees that ‘[f]reedom
of association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like,
shall be prescribed by law,’”233 Suharto’s policies severely limited civil
rights. This has had enormous consequences in West Papua where
separatist sentiment has been present for decades. For example, freedom of
association was severely curtailed under Suharto because the “process of
granting permits for meetings allow[ed] the government to determine who
can or cannot speak at forums or seminars. Under Article 510 of the
Criminal Code, police are authorized to disband any discussion or forum
that does not have a permit.”234 Additionally, as part of its integrationist
policies,
[t]he Suharto government did not like to make any distinction
between the ethnic groups that made up the state of Indonesia;
therefore it did not acknowledge any group as West Papuan,
Papuan, or Melanesian, but rather as Irianese . . . . The terms
“West Papuan,” “Papuan,” and “Melanesian” were illegal under
Suharto, with their use being associated with the separatist
movement . . . .235
Amazingly, as part of these broader policies that infringed upon civil
rights, the hoisting of a West Papuan flag was “a matter of national
interest,” and a “‘law making any kind of protest punishable as an act of
subversion’” resulted in one Papuan being sentenced to twenty years in
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 105.
Id. at 79; see also supra Part IV.B.
Dufseth, supra note 20, at 615 (quoting INDON. CONST. art. 28 (1945)).
LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 45.
LEITH, supra note 33, at xxv.
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prison for doing so.236 Finally, during President’s Suharto regime,
“political leaders disappeared or were imprisoned, tortured, or executed;
peaceful political dissent was violently crushed; and the rule of law
remained subordinate to an all-powerful executive branch.”237
H. Papuan Religion and Culture
In 1993 it was written, “[i]f Indonesian policies are not changed,
virtually all of West Papua’s tribal people will be culturally extinct within
fifty years.”238 This is attributable to the combination of environmental
devastation, aggressive transmigration policies, military-imposed abuse and
control, and three decades of uncompromising integrationist policies
developed by Sukarno and later perfected by Suharto. This projection,
however, did not take into account the eventual fall of Suharto’s threedecade rule in 1998. Since then, drastic changes have occurred, which will
hopefully ameliorate the endangerment of West Papuan tribes. 239
As an example of the degree of interference with West Papuan culture in
the name of assimilation, “[b]eginning in 1971, the Indonesian government
implemented a ‘humanitarian’ project called Operation Koteka in the
interior regions of Irian Jaya.”240 This movement aimed “to end the
wearing of the koteka penis sheath.”241 The koteka is worn by the males of
many West Papuan tribes as a central part of their tribal identity, and is also
used in ceremonies. In response to Operation Koteka, “[f]oreign critics
perceived the programme to be one of political and cultural
indoctrination.”242
In addition to implementing official state policies aimed at assimilating
the tribes of West Papua, such as Operation Koteka, many critics have
described Indonesia’s policies as genocidal. At the 1999 congressional
hearing, Representative Faleomavaega reported that
the native Papuan people have suffered under one of the most
repressive and unjust systems of colonial occupation in the 20th
century. . . . [T]he Indonesian military has been brutal in West
Papua New Guinea. Reports estimate that between 100,000 to
200,000 West Papuans have died or simply vanished at the hands
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175.
Dufseth, supra note 20, at 613–14.
DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 172.
See infra Part V.A.
Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 208.
Id.
Id.
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of the Indonesian military. While we search for justice and
peace in East Timor, . . . we should not forget the violent tragedy
that continues to play out today in West Papua New Guinea.243
Because of the deaths, cultural assimilation, and dilution of tribal
populations associated with transmigration, many West Papuans have
resorted to flight. As of 2005, there were “approximately 2460 West
Papuan refugees living at East Awin” in the nation of Papua New
Guinea.244 The refugee situation caused by West Papuans crossing the
border from West Papua, Indonesia, to Papua New Guinea has prompted a
response by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.245
V. Policies During the Post-Revolution, “Special Autonomy” Era:
“West Papua” (1998–Present)
A. Reform Era and Constitutional Developments
After several weeks of social unrest, on May 21, 1998, President Suharto
resigned and his Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, became his successor in
accordance with the Indonesian Constitution. Even as an interim president,
President Habibie immediately “opened the door to political reform . . . ,
eased constraints on the press and released political prisoners.”246 At the
time he took office, there were so many economic, political, and social
problems in Indonesia that by 2002, one observer noted, “Indonesia is
entering the fifth year of its post-Suharto ‘Reform Era,’ but the nation-state
seems to be pulling itself apart at the seams.”247
The “Reform Era” has been characterized by a tension between two
polarized predispositions, described by one scholar as “a double movement
of reference.”248 Under this view,
[o]ne direction is inward, towards indigenousness, authenticity,
and Indonesian values, in an effort to find local points of support
in the face of global moral corruption. The other direction is
outward, towards universality, modernity, and transcultural
243. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48.
244. Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 205–06 (detailing the plight of West Papuan refugees
in Papua New Guinea).
245. Id.
246. Cindy Shiner, Indonesia Police Fire on Separatists, WASH. POST, July 7, 1998, at
A08.
247. BOWEN, supra note 85, at 4.
248. Id.
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values of social equality, in the hopes that these values may help
overcome local injustices.249
This tension is also reflected in the struggle for indigenous rights in West
Papua, which “can be divided into two components: the internal struggle for
self-identification, and concomitantly the struggle against external forces,
including state and multinational corporations, which have violated the
rights of [indigenous peoples].”250
Despite the uncertainty of the post-Suharto economic and political
environment, “the institutional changes after 1998 have been nearrevolutionary.”251 Most importantly, the 1945 Constitution was amended
“and new laws were passed to democratize Indonesia’s political system.”252
More specifically, the “Constitution of 1945 was preserved but amended to
include several provisions that allow for regional differences and autonomy.
Regional units . . . are now accorded wide-ranging autonomy in all spheres
except those that, by law, were specified as within the jurisdiction of the
central government.”253 For West Papua, these changes have beckoned a
new era of reform and self-realization.
B. Separatism
As discussed, separatism emerged in West Papua during the final days of
colonial control “when the Dutch stepped up economic and political
development to thwart Indonesia’s attempt to gain outside support for their
cause by increasing the perception of West Irian as a viable independent
state.”254 Over the next thirty years, the OPM “carried out sporadic actions
both in Irian Jaya and abroad, to express their resistance to the Indonesian
rule.”255
After he came to power, “Irianese leaders living in Jakarta called on
President B.J. Habibie to grant immediate autonomy to their home province
and accused the central government of failing to bring prosperity to their
territory.”256 They also “demanded a change in the name of their province
to West Papua.”257 Given these pressing issues, the new administration
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focused on efforts “to quell [the separatist] movements by granting limited
regional autonomy.”258 These efforts have met with mixed success.
Although it has only been fifteen years since the fall of Suharto, the
“post-Suharto government has been unable to reconcile the Papuans’ desire
for independence with its vision of a unified Indonesia.”259 For example,
when President Habibie “met with a delegation of 100 provincial
representatives . . . in February 1999 to launch a ‘National Dialogue’
regarding Papuan autonomy, the delegation declared its desire for
independence.”260 The response to this “clear call for independence” was
“to ban all discussion or dissemination of information on independence or
autonomy,”261 harkening back to Suharto’s strict limitations on freedom of
speech and assembly. The activist group Human Rights Watch “decried the
Order as calling for ‘systemic violations of free expression, assembly, and
association rights.’”262
By the year 2000, there were at least six instances where “police broke
up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan
independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted, killed, and injured
many demonstrators.”263 By this time, President Wahid, the first elected
president after Suharto, was in power. As a token gesture, “Wahid
suggested that Irian Jaya should be renamed Papua in deference to local
sentiment.”264 The Indonesian Parliament ratified Wahid’s suggestion
through the Special Autonomy Bill for Papua, discussed below, which
became effective in 2001.265 Despite this improvement, Wahid later
declared, “because the Morning Star flag was a separatist symbol, Papuans
would need to find ‘another cultural symbol.’
After Wahid’s
announcement, the military engaged in ‘periodic and often violent raids . . .
on gatherings where independence symbols [were] on display.’”266
In the early 2000s, “intra-state separatist and ethnic . . . conflicts [had]
given rise to grave and pressing human rights and humanitarian
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problems.”267 In 2003, the “Indonesian government renewed its warning to
Papuan separatists that harsher measures by security forces would ensue
should they continue their secessionist movement.”268 Despite this
violence, the new administrations have attempted to subdue separatist
activity through the enactment of new laws granting more autonomy to
West Papua.
C. “Special Autonomy” Status
In addition to the constitutional amendment “to recognize regional
differences and enshrine principles of autonomy,” new laws were enacted
that “created autonomous regions”; in particular, “[s]pecial autonomy laws
were passed to accommodate the demands of Aceh and Papua.”269 When
the “Special Autonomy” Law was initially passed in 1999 under President
Habibie, its effect remained unclear.270 Indeed, “the widespread powers
[the laws] purport to leave to the Central Government and the broad
wording used to describe these powers could effectively reduce
significantly the powers left to the regions.”271 It was also “entirely
uncertain . . . how the Central Government intend[ed] to transfer to the
regions the funds, the personnel, the equipment, and the infrastructures that
the regions [would] need to exercise their newly transferred powers.”272
While these new laws “represent a significant departure from the
authoritarian policies of the New Order,”273 some critics also feel that they
“fail to accommodate the political aspirations of parties advocating for
independence, even when they do so peacefully.”274 The shortcomings in
the new legislation are also “compounded by the executive’s ready resort to
military force to suppress both peaceful and armed pro-independence
activists. The bloodshed in Aceh and Papua has gathered international
attention and disdain.”275 This overreliance on the military is a lasting
vestige of Suharto’s administration.
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By 2001, however, a more specific Special Autonomy Law was enacted
that addressed the West Papuan concern over natural resources. Under the
new law, “Papua will receive up to 80% of the revenue from natural
resources[,] forestry and fishery[,] and 70% from oil, gas and mining.”276
This addresses a major concern for the West Papuans, but success in its
implementation has yet to be realized.
This same law, moreover, “also allows the province to use its own flag,
anthem and change its name from Irian Jaya to Papua, which are important
symbols of a people’s identity.”277 Therefore, despite its shortcomings, the
new Special Autonomy Law grants some power to the West Papuans. It
has “granted autonomy at the provincial level, whereby the Papuan
government obtained jurisdiction over all matters except foreign policy,
defense, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, and justice.”278 While the full
effect of these laws has yet to come to fruition, the West Papuans have
minimally gained a voice in their governance and their voice has been
heard. “[T]he 2001 Special Autonomy Law for Papua appears to be a
genuine effort to accommodate Papuan demands.”279
While it is too soon to fully evaluate West Papua’s Special Autonomy
status, parallels can be drawn to the Indian New Deal era in Federal Indian
law when, “[f]or the first time, assimilation was not the goal of Ffederal
Indian services. Rather, tribal culture and organization were to be
preserved while providing Indians with the tools to achieve economically
and culturally.”280 One of the tools provided to West Papua in furtherance
of autonomy is a variety of new political institutions for self-governance.
D. Political Institutions
In addition to providing “many new areas of local authority, substantial
fiscal resources, [and] much greater control over the region’s natural
resources,”281 the 2001 Special Autonomy Law also created new political
institutions in Papua.282 This included the creation of the Papuan People’s
Representative Assembly, a legislative body representing all of the people
of West Papua.283 A second institution, the Papuan People’s Assembly,
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was formed “to represent indigenous Papuan groups” and “included local
customary groups, as well as religious and women’s groups.”284 The new
Assembly “was given the mandate of promoting and protecting the rights
and customs of Papuan people and [was] endowed with the powers of
consultation and assent regarding both candidates for the position of
governor and decisions and regulations relating to the basic rights of
Papuans.”285
While these institutions are still in their infancy, they represent an
important change in the policies of Indonesia toward the indigenous people
of West Papua. These changes also represent a shift from Indonesia’s
former “strong unitarist approach” to “a quasi-federal form, while resisting
any tendency toward a pluralist federation.”286 Because this shift is still
evolving, it remains to be seen just how much West Papua will gain through
this transition.
E. Land Ownership and Natural Resources Management
While the full extent of reform in Indonesia is still unclear, the Special
Autonomy Law for West Papua has addressed the natural resources issues
discussed above.287 However, because “Papua is so heavily endowed with
mineral wealth, . . . Indonesia seems unlikely ever to loosen its grip,”288
despite the language and purpose of the new laws. Additionally, in
response to worldwide condemnation of its questionable environmental and
social policies, Freeport has undertaken a variety of “community
development” initiatives and in some ways has remained a constant during
the tumultuous period after the fall of Suharto, with its rapid succession of
new presidents.289 Indeed, “in the continuing absence of a responsible
government, the company will reluctantly continue in the role of de facto
administrator and developer around its concession area.”290
Through its “community development program,” Freeport “provides
much needed public health and medical programs for the area.”291
Additionally, Freeport runs an education program “which involves building
schools, dormitories, and vocational training centers; teaching literacy;
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supplying uniforms; supporting teachers in local villages and offering
scholarships.”292 Strangely, the fact that Freeport is now serving as a quasigovernment in the area strengthens the analogy to the origins of the Dutch
nationalized colony, which began as the commercial enterprise of the Dutch
East India Company.293
On the other hand, Freeport no longer has a steadfast ally after the fall of
Suharto. “For more than thirty years Freeport was feted by the Suharto
regime and was politically significant in Indonesia. Today Suharto’s
successors vilify the company for political expediency. While Freeport
knew how to protect itself under Suharto, it is struggling in this new
political climate.”294 The resulting combination of the new Indonesian
government’s mistrust of Freeport and Freeport’s new role as a quasigovernmental body in West Papua remains unclear.
Although it is too soon to judge, perhaps West Papua’s new Special
Autonomy status will come to mimic the current era in Federal Indian law,
the Self-Determination Era, where “[n]ative nations are pursuing economic
development in order to have the freedom to control their own political,
cultural and social destinies and to have the ability to sustain communities
where their citizens can and want to live.”295 Like this era in Federal Indian
law, it will be decades before we can evaluate whether West Papua’s new
status will be an effective means to meet these goals.
VI. Conclusion
In the almost five decades it has controlled the province, the Republic of
Indonesia has undergone a series of rapid changes in its policies toward the
indigenous people of West Papua. The majority of this period fell under
Suharto’s rule, and many of Suharto’s policies mirrored those of Federal
Indian law. Most profoundly, the strong integrationist policy instigated by
Sukarno, and furthered by Suharto, is congruent to the assimilationist
tendencies during the Reservation, Allotment, and Assimilation eras of
Federal Indian law. Similarly, the Removal era of Federal Indian law
shares core underlying policies with the transmigration program under
Suharto. Additionally, most of the case law involving indigenous people in
Indonesia involves issues surrounding the exploitation of natural resources
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and land ownership rights, which is also a strong current in Federal Indian
law. Ironically, many of the more abusive policies leading to these cases
involve American corporations, which have been complicit in the
oppression of West Papuans.
While the picture was grim under Sukarno and Suharto, recent
developments in the fifteen years since Suharto’s fall from power have
rapidly changed the policies of Indonesia toward the West Papuans. These
new policies, which grant West Papuans increased autonomy and finally
recognize the value of their culture, after decades of forced assimilation, are
still too new to evaluate. It is possible, however, that the West Papuans
may gain independence due to the momentum of a sixty-year separatist
movement, the concerns of which are finally being heard as evidenced
through the enactment of the Special Autonomy Laws. If West Papua is
able to move toward independence and harness its enormous natural
resources wealth, it may eventually stand in a better position than many of
the tribes in North America, which are facing diminishing tribal sovereignty
and increasing state encroachment.
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